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Abstract This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible
resources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account. We
propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed
with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth
is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as affecting global
welfare. First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we exam-
ine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction path, the
dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their respective levels entail
inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world resource allocation, the tax
revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly the distortional and distributional effects
of local taxes. Then, we completely assess the overall impact of a unilateral tax increase.
Finally, we find that, even if heterogeneous countries coordinate their taxation policies to
correct the global environmental problem, their divergent strategic interests cause another
global, non-environmental distortion in the allocation of the resource.
Keywords Non-renewable resources · Stock pollution · Endogenous growth ·
Environmental taxation · Inter-country effects
1 Introduction
A current challenge for environmental economists is to advocate instruments to reduce the
impact of climate change. Due to the global character of this phenomenon, whatever are
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the chosen instruments, participation of a large group of countries will be needed to imple-
ment an efficient policy. Hence, a particular aspect of economic instruments that deserves
major attention is their international impacts. This paper aims at examining these impacts of
taxes on the use of polluting non-renewable resources. This issue proves to be of a particular
relevance when countries are heterogeneous along one or more dimensions.
A large literature investigates the optimal taxation of these resources. The first studies (in
the 1990s) used partial equilibrium models of an exhaustible resource depletion where the
flow of resource fills a stock of pollution. The optimal dynamics of depletion in presence of
climate change was computed and compared to that in absence of climate change by Withagen
(1994). Sinclair (1992), Ulph and Ulph (1994), and Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) analyzed
the impacts of a carbon tax on the decentralized equilibrium and characterized the optimal
tax schemes correcting the environmental distortion. More recently (in the 2000s), this issue
has been addressed in dynamic general equilibrium, still one-country, models of endogenous
growth. As a first step, some authors considered the flow of pollution from the resource
consumption to be harmful (Schou 2000, 2002 and Grimaud and Rougé 2005). A substantial
theoretical improvement has been done by modeling pollution as in the partial equilibrium
literature above, i.e. by assuming the stock of atmospheric pollution to have negative effects
on the economy. Groth and Schou (2007) and Grimaud and Rougé (2008) represent1 this
new generation of analytical studies. Overall, this literature highlights the requirement of
a dynamic framework under perfect anticipations and of the explicit consideration of the
resource exhaustibility (On this, see also Belgodere 2009). It then emphasizes the particu-
lar role of the time profile of the environmental tax rate. Precisely, extraction under laissez
faire is shown to be faster than optimally, this distortion being corrected by a decreasing ad
valorem tax on the resource use. This optimal policy fosters growth and slows down resource
depletion.
On the one hand, these contributions are particularly relevant to address climate change.
Indeed, it is now well known that carbon dioxide is the main anthropogenic greenhouse gas2
and that a very large part of its emissions is due to combustion of exhaustible fossil fuels.3
On the other hand, only aggregated models, representing a homogeneous world, have
been used to study taxation of fossil fuels. However, the real world is very heterogeneous
with respect to oil endowments,4 for example. Moreover, taxation of an exhaustible resource
whose distribution among countries is heterogeneous entails inter-country transfers5 and thus
conflicting interests.
Indeed, exploitation of a non-renewable resource generates pure rents that, as such, are
partly captured through a tax on the resource (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Sinn 1982 and
Gaudet and Lasserre 1990): independently of the effect of the tax on the extraction path,
1 Other important papers deal with the related question of environmental taxation in presence of innovation
externalities. One could refer to Goulder and Mathai (2000), Hart (2008) and Gerlagh et al. (2009), among
others. Although our model features an endogenous growth mechanism for consistency with the recent liter-
ature, we focus on the correction of the environmental externality.
2 Carbon dioxide from energy represents 95% of the energy-related greenhouse gas emissions and about 80%
of the world anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Quadrelli and Peterson 2007).
3 In 2004, fossil sources accounted for 81% of the global primary energy supply (Quadrelli and Peterson
2007).
4 Combustion of oil products generates 40% of the world carbon dioxide emissions; it is the most important
source of carbon dioxide emissions (Quadrelli and Peterson 2007). The 19 countries with the largest crude oil
reserves per capita represent more than 80% of the world reserves (source: PennWell Corporation 2004).
5 Other, most-cited, distributional effects of environmental policies are intergenerational transfers or transfers
between different categories of residents inside the same country. Our point here is different: environmental
taxation benefits some countries at the expense of other countries.
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it shifts much of the tax burden to the resource owners. Bergstrom (1982) and Brander and
Djajic (1983) highlighted that national taxes on these resources can be used strategically by
resource consuming countries in order to extract the rents to be earned by the resource pro-
ducing countries. These contributions suggest that taxation of exhaustible resources, when
their distribution is heterogeneous, is an international issue that must be addressed in a
multi-country model.
Other related articles tackle the taxation problem in presence of a pollution externality. In
a multi-country setting with harmful emissions from the use of the resource, Amundsen and
Schöb (1999) examined the optimal environmental taxation policy when there are several
identical countries consuming the resource and a single resource holder. Rubio and Escriche
(2001) and Liski and Tahvonen (2004) studied the strategic interaction between a resource-
consuming country using an environmental tax and an exporting cartel when the resource is
a stock pollutant. In these models, however, the consuming region is perfectly homogeneous.
The objective of this paper is to address the taxation of a polluting non-renewable resource
in an international, heterogeneous framework. To this purpose, we simply divide into two
regions a canonical—in the sense of the analytical literature cited above (for instance Groth
and Schou 2007 and Grimaud and Rougé 2008)—endogenous growth (à la Romer 19906)
model of climate change where the combustion of an exhaustible resource generates emis-
sions accumulating into a world stock of pollution, representing the greenhouse effect. More-
over, because potential conflicting interests would arise from the different characteristics of
countries, we take advantage of the two-country model to introduce realistic international het-
erogeneities. A surprising difference between the top oil producing and the top oil consuming
countries is that the former are often poorer than the latter.7 As a result of this endowment
heterogeneity and the related heterogeneity in productivity levels throughout the world, the
North largely consumes this resource, while the South mainly exports it. We will then divide
the world economy into two regions: the North, representing the developed, top oil consum-
ing countries, and the South, representing the relatively low-productive, top oil producing
countries. Consistently, we also assume that world economic growth is driven by a north-
ern research sector and that intellectual property rights (IPRs for short) are not enforced in
the South.
This North-South division raises some issues regarding the international effects of regional
environmental taxation and thus the possibility to solve a global problem with local tax-set-
ting. First, we shall see that every environmental taxation policy implies a certain sharing
of the world production. Second, in order to understand the benefit of one country from
modifying its local tax rate, one needs to examine how such a deviation alters the local tax
revenues, relative competitiveness and the global efficiency of the polluting resource allo-
cation. Third, since regional taxes change the location of productive activities and IPRs are
not homogeneously enforced, the potential growth effect of environmental taxation should
also be addressed. This is done here as a peripheral question. Finally, national taxes set by
environment-conscious governments may solve a global environmental problem; however,
if so, international conflicting interests may lead to a non-environmental distortion.
Here is the major novelty with respect to the standard literature on optimal taxation of
a polluting non-renewable resource. The optimal policy generally obtained in one-country
6 Although such a modeling is subject to the famous “knife-edge” criticism, it has the advantage of provid-
ing a very canonical description of the R&D activities that captures the basic issues relative to knowledge
production.
7 For instance, the per capita GNI over the 19 countries with the largest crude oil reserves per capita was
lower than 5800 US$ in 2005 (sources: The World Bank, PennWell Corporation 2004). The same year, OECD
represented 60% of world oil consumption (source: EIA).
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models (or in models where the resource-consuming region is homogeneous) corrects the in-
tertemporal problem of pollution accumulation and ensures static efficiency in the allocation
of the polluting resource. The two-country division highlights that, even if heterogeneous
countries cooperate to solve the environmental problem, their diverging interests deteriorate
static efficiency, thus causing a new distortion in the allocation of the resource.
The inter-country effects these issues rely on can be expected to be of a substantial mag-
nitude. Indeed, although extremely heterogeneous, taxes on the use of fossil fuels are very
high in top oil consuming regions,8 thus representing a large part of their fiscal revenues.9
Understanding these effects and drawing their policy implications is all the more relevant as
rising these taxes seem to be currently tempting for environmental and fiscal reasons.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model and characterize the
associated socially optimum allocation. Section 3 describes the solution of the decentralized
equilibrium and examine qualitatively the effects of the time profile of the environmental
tax rates as well as those of the environmental tax levels. In particular, we examine the
potential growth effect of the tax levels under heterogeneous IPRs enforcement. In the same
section, the optimal environmental taxation is determined. The results of Sections 2 and 3
are generalizations of those obtained in the literature on taxation of polluting exhaustible
resources to the case of a multi-country world. These extensions emphasize the need that
countries coordinate their environmental taxation policies. Section 4 studies the effects of
the national tax levels on the output and consumption in the two countries and on the global
efficiency of the resource allocation. We examine isolatedly a distributional rent transfer
effect and a locational efficiency effect. Next, we compute the total impact of an increase in
the northern environmental tax level. Finally, we shed light on the strategic interests of both
countries in setting their environmental taxes at a lower or a greater rate, depending on their
characteristics.
2 Model and Welfare
2.1 Model
At each date t ∈ [0,+∞), the final output is produced in both countries using the range
of available intermediate goods, labor and a flow of resource. The aggregate production
functions are10,11
Yi =
⎛
⎝
Ai∫
0
xi ( j)α d j
⎞
⎠ LYi β Ri γ , α, β, γ > 0, α + β + γ = 1, i = N , S, (1)
where xi ( j) is the amount used of intermediate good j , LYi is the quantity of labor employed in
the production sector, Ri is the quantity of natural resource burnt in country i . The subscripts
N and S refer respectively to the North and the South.
8 On this, see Bacon (2001) and IEA (2001).
9 Taxes on oil products constitute 6% of the total fiscal revenues of OECD member countries (Source: IEA).
The G7 countries made $517 billion per year through these taxes over the period 2003–2007 (See OPEC
(2008)).
10 For simplicity, the time argument of each variable is dropped as long as this does not create ambiguity.
11 The production functions for the two countries are identical. This is assumed for simplicity. Indeed, intro-
ducing heterogeneities relative to the technology would have made the dynamics too complicated and the
distributional analysis unfeasible.
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Ai , i = N , S, is an index of technological development which measures the range of
the available innovations in each country. Only the North is engaged in a research activity.
Denoting derivatives with respect to time by a dot above the variable, the production of
innovations writes
A˙N = ψ AN L AN , ψ > 0, (2)
where L AN is the quantity of labor employed in the research sector.12 A constant fraction
φ, 0 < φ ≤ 1, of the ever discovered innovations diffuses naturally to the South while the
remaining ones cannot be used in this country:
AS = φAN , 0 < φ ≤ 1. (3)
φ can be interpreted as an index of southern development.
To each available innovation is associated an intermediate good produced in both countries
through a one-for-one technology from the final output:
xi ( j) = yi ( j), j ∈ [0, Ai ], i = N , S, (4)
where yi ( j) is the quantity of final good used to produce xi ( j).
The resource is freely extracted from a finite initial stock (Q):
Q˙ = −R = −(RN + RS), Q(0) = Q0 > 0, given, (5)
and its use results in a proportional flow of pollution emptying a stock of environment quality
(E)13:
E˙ = −h R = −h(RN + RS), h > 0, E(0) = E0 > hQ0, given. (6)
Each household is endowed with one unit of labor. The total quantities of labor in North
and South respectively are locally fixed and constant over time:
LYN + L AN ≤ L N , (7)
LYS ≤ L S . (8)
The households of both countries consume the amount of the final good remaining after
the production of the intermediates so that the world level of consumption, C , must satisfy
the world’s constraint on the use of the final good:
CN + CS +
AN∫
0
xN ( j) d j +
AS∫
0
xS( j) d j ≤ YN + YS . (9)
12 Such a standard production function abstracts from the potential role of other inputs than labor and knowl-
edge. Other kinds of R&D efforts could be considered, as for example in Tsur and Zemel (2007). Moreover,
we think it would be interesting to study the optimal environmental policy when the polluting exhaustible
resource is an essential input of the knowledge production, as it is suggested for example in Groth and Schou
(2002), page 387. In the present paper, we avoid this complication that is expected not to change the results
relative to the inter-country effects of local environmental policies.
13 Following Groth and Schou (2007), we ignore the regeneration ability of the atmosphere. This is for
simplicity since, from a control theoretic point of view, this definition of the level of environmental quality
reduces the problem by one state variable. However, all our results are robust to the introduction of a linear
auto-regeneration process.
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Fig. 1 Phase diagram
The preferences of the infinitely-lived representative households of North and South are
identical and represented by the utility functions
Ui =
+∞∫
0
ln
(
Ci
Li
Eλ
)
e−ρt dt, i = N , S, λ, ρ > 0, (10)
where λ is an index of environmental concern and ρ the psychological discount rate.14
2.2 Welfare
Let us characterize the Pareto optima of this economy. They are the solutions of the weighted
utilitarian social planner’s program. This program consists in maximizing
+∞∫
0
[
δL N ln
(
CN
L N
Eλ
)
+ (1 − δ)L S ln
(
CS
L S
Eλ
)]
e−ρt dt, 0 < δ < 1, (11)
subject to Eqs. (1–9) with respect to Ci , xi , Ri , LYi and L AN , i = N , S. At each value of δ in
(0, 1) is associated a solution to the problem that will be a particular optimum in the Pareto
set.15
The results are formally given in Appendix A. Using these results and the phase diagram
of Fig. 1, we fully describe the optimal dynamics of the economy. The main findings are
summarized in Proposition 1. The growth rate of any variable X is denoted by gX . We define
14 This functional form features a constant, unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the two coun-
tries. Moreover, the utility function is the same in the two countries. In particular, we don’t consider any
heterogeneity relative to the environmental concern and to the discount rate. This is made in order to keep the
analysis feasible.
15 In this two-country model, it is particularly important to cover the entire set of Pareto optima. Later in the
paper, it will allow us to make a clear distinction between efficiency effects (Proposition 4) and distributional
effects (Proposition 5) of environmental policies.
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global variables as follows: Y = YN + YS , C = CN + CS , R = RN + RS and x = xN + xS
while AN = A and AS = φA. The upper-script o is used for optimum.
Proposition 1 In the Pareto set:
ı) LYN
o
and L AN
o = L N − LYN o immediately jump to constant values. Thus, gAoN = gAoS =
gAo = ψL AN o is always constant. The relative output, Y
o
N (t)
Y oS (t)
, is constant over time and
is a decreasing function of the index of southern productivity, φ. The relative consump-
tion level, C
o
N (t)/L N
CoS(t)/L S
, is constant over time and is an increasing function of the relative
weight of the North in the social welfare function, δ.
ı ı) If households are indifferent to the environmental quality (λ = 0), the economy imme-
diately jumps to its steady-state, in which
⎧⎨
⎩
gRoN = gRoS = gRo = −ρ
gCoN = gCoS = gCo = gY o = gY oN = gY oS = gAo −
γρ
1−α
gxoN = gxoS = gxo = −
γρ
1−α
.
ı ı ı) In the case of environmental concern (λ > 0), the economy is always in transition while
converging towards the steady-state where pollution does not matter (λ = 0). The flow
of resource use decreases over time: −ρ < goR(t) < 0 and limt →+∞ goR(t) = −ρ.
Hence, the resource is extracted and used slower than with no environmental concern.
The rates of growth of production and consumption levels, goY (t) and goC (t), are also
higher in this case.
Proof of Proposition 1 See Appendix A.
Let us give further details about these results.
First of all, note that, if households are indifferent to the environment, that is to say if pol-
lution is not harmful (λ = 0), the economy immediately jumps to its steady-state and keeps
growing regularly. Indeed, the growth rate of the stock of knowledge is always constant and
in case of no pollution concerns, the resource is optimally depleted at a constant rate. Hence,
the transitional dynamics of the model stems from the introduction of the environmental
issue.
Let us now examine the optimal dynamics of the economy. To do so, we construct the
phase diagram represented in Fig. 1.
The optimal rate of extraction is shown in Appendix A to obey goR = −ρ −λ(1−α)goE/γ
(equation (A.25)). Obviously, goR is related to goE since it internalizes the effect of extracting
and burning the resource R, on the environmental quality, E . This equation is represented
in Fig. 1 by the straight line (HC). Differentiating (A.25) with respect to time leads to
g˙oR = −λ(1 − α)g˙oE/γ . From this, let us note that if g˙oE ≥ 0 then g˙oR ≤ 0 and inversely.
From the definition of pollution (6), E˙o = −h Ro, one gets goE = −h Ro/Eo. Log-dif-
ferentiating with respect to time leads to g˙oE/g
o
E = goR − goE , i.e. g˙oE = goE (goR − goE ). This
equation and the fact that goE < 0 imply that, if g
o
R ≥ goE , then g˙oE ≤ 0, and thus g˙oR ≥ 0.
Inversely, if goE ≥ goR , then g˙oE ≥ 0 and g˙oR ≤ 0. This gives the dynamics of goR and goE on
both sides of the gR = gE line in Fig. 1.
Before studying the phase diagram, we need to make two remarks. First, the flow of
resource extraction is strictly positive at every date t ≥ 0. Indeed, the resource is essential in
the sense that the marginal productivity of the resource gets infinite as the resource use goes
to 0, (limR →0 ∂Y/∂ R = +∞), and marginal utility gets infinite as consumption goes to 0
(limCi →0 ∂Ui/∂Ci = +∞, i = N , S). Hence, R(t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
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Second, the stock of the resource is completely depleted asymptotically. Indeed, each
unit of resource consumed in the production process at any date can be used in such a way
that it improves welfare. Its effect on utility is twofold. First, it allows an increase in con-
sumption. Second, it increases the stock of pollution, thus being harmful from the date of
its use on. The former positive effect can be marginally infinite due to the essentiality of
the resource. However, due to the finite amount of resource, and thus the finiteness of the
stock of pollution, and the continuity of damages in this stock, the latter effect is bounded:
the marginal disutility of extraction at any date t ≥ 0, and thus of pollution, formally writes∫ +∞
t (δL N + (1 − δ)L S)λ(1/E(s))(∂E(s)/∂ R(t))e−ρ(s−t) ds, where ∂E(s)/∂ R(t) = −h
as s ≥ t and 1/E(s) < 1/(E0 − hQ0) since E0 − hQ0 is the positive lower bound of
the environmental quality, reached after the polluting resource is fully exhausted. Hence,
by spreading enough the use of the resource over time, more resource can be depleted in a
utility improving way. Technically, this is to say that the costate variable associated to the
exhaustibility constraint on the polluting resource (μQ in Appendix A) is strictly positive,
thus meaning that the social value of each unit of resource is strictly positive.
Let us now study the phase diagram depicted in Fig. 1. There are two steady-states, SS1
and SS2. SS1 is unstable. Along this steady-state, gR(t) and gE (t) are negative and constant.
Thus, lim
t→+∞ gR(t) < 0 and limt→+∞ gE (t) < 0. In particular, gR(t) = gR < 0,∀t , implies
R(t) = R(0)egRt and lim
t→+∞ R(t) = 0. By (6), this implies that limt→+∞ gE (t) = 0, which
contradicts lim
t→+∞ gE (t) < 0 above. The path SS1 can thus be ruled out. The divergence
along (HC) towards a positive rate of extraction can also be ruled out. Indeed, a positive
gR would lead to an exhaustion in finite time. This would contradict R(t) > 0,∀t , which is
stated above.
Therefore, the economy converges to SS2 along the horizon, following the part of (HC)
which is below SS1. However, the economy will never reach SS2. Indeed, along this path,
gE = 0. By (6), this implies R(t) = 0, which has been shown above not to be optimal.
SS2 corresponds to the case of the absence of pollution (λ = 0). Therefore, it will also be
the ”laissez-faire” equilibrium, when environment is not internalized. We shall see it later in
Subsection 3.2.
It is worth noting how the main variables evolve along this transition. The optimal growth
rate of extraction, goR , decreases over time and converges to its lower bound, −ρ. It means
that this rate is always greater than without pollution. It also means that the introduction
of pollution in the economy renders desirable to extract the resource more slowly. This is
consistent with the findings of Withagen (1994) and Grimaud and Rougé (2008) .
Environmental quality decreases unambiguously over time, goE being negative, and reaches
asymptotically its lower limit, goE converging to 0. Hence, the environmental quality decays
slower and slower.
The dynamics of output is driven by both that of the resource extraction and that of the
innovation side of the model. On the one hand, the allocation of labor being stable over time,
the quantity of labor used in the production process is constant while the stock of knowl-
edge and the number of intermediates grow at constant rates. On the other hand, the use of
the resource is not regular but asymptotically. Consistently, output grows faster along the
transition than along the asymptotic steady-state.
Eventually, Proposition 1 emphasizes the continuum of Pareto optima depending on how
is shared the output between the two countries. In our social planning approach, this will
depend on how the planner weights both groups of households. Beyond the study of how to
design policies to implement a social optimum in a decentralized economy, our two-country
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approach helps investigate how these policies affect the split of the output between North
and South and thus their relative benefits from these policies.
The results about the optimal depletion of the resource and the path of pollution accu-
mulation are consistent with the findings of the literature mentioned in the Introduction.
Proposition 1 then offers a generalization of these results to the case of a two-country
economy.
3 Decentralized Equilibrium for Given National Taxes
Given our examination of the optimal dynamics, we can characterize, in a decentralized
model, the optimal taxation policy in the presence of a pollution externality. Moreover, this
decentralized approach will render possible to investigate the effects of the national environ-
mental taxes on the general equilibrium outcome.
On the one hand, we follow the literature regarding the basic assumptions relative to the
growth engine, to the nature of the goods and to the markets’ structures. Endogenous growth
is modeled à la Romer and is driven by northern research. The final good, the intermediate
goods and the extracted resource are private and freely tradable across countries. There is
a world financial market.16 The stock of atmospheric pollution is a pure public bad. The
final sectors, the research sector and the extraction sector are perfectly competitive while the
intermediate sector is monopolistic.
On the other hand, beyond the technological heterogeneities introduced in the previous
section (international differences in labor productivities and countries’ sizes), we can intro-
duce other heterogeneities in the decentralized two-country framework. We assume that the
southern households own the entire stock of the natural resource. Moreover, intellectual
property rights (IPRs for short) are perfectly enforced in the North while they are not in
the South.
The sources of inefficiency will thus be the standard public good character of knowledge
and pollution and the monopolistic structure of the northern intermediate sector. Consistently,
subsidies to the northern research sector and to the use of intermediates will be sufficient
instruments to solve the distortions about the suboptimal investment in R&D. Furthermore,
in order to solve the environmental problem, we assume the existence of two national taxes
on the local use of the polluting resource.
3.1 Agents’ Behavior
3.1.1 The Northern Final Sector
In what follows, the final good is chosen to be the numeraire of the economy and its price is
normalized to unity.
16 Thanks to the Walras law, and following the common practice, we can avoid computing the equilibrium
on this market. However, it is interesting to give more details about this market whose description is typi-
cally omitted. As it will be clear in the following, in this market, the intermediate sector is a borrower since
patent-holding monopolies earn the proceeds of their investment after the date of the associated innovation.
The only lenders are the households of both countries. More generally, the governments may be additional
actors. However, here, their budgets will be assumed to be balanced at each date for simplicity so that there is
no need for the governments to participate to the financial market (See Appendix B for a complete description
of these operations).
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The program of this sector consists in maximizing its profit,
(∫ A
0 xN ( j)α d j
)
LYN
β RN γ −∫ A
0 pN ( j)(1 − sN )xN ( j) d j − wN LYN − pR(1 + θN )RN , with respect to all xN ( j), LYN and
RN . In this expression, pN ( j) is the unit price of intermediate good j , sN is the unit subsidy
to the use of intermediate goods in the North, wN is the wage rate in the North,17 pR is the
unit price of the extracted resource and θN > −1 is the unit ad valorem tax on the use of the
resource. The behavior of this sector is summarized by the first-order conditions
αxN ( j)α−1LYN
β RN γ = pN ( j)(1 − sN ), j ∈ [0, A], (12)
β
YN
LYN
= wN , (13)
γ
YN
RN
= pRτN , (14)
where18 τN = 1 + θN > 0.
3.1.2 The Southern Final Sector
The program of this sector is similar to that of the northern final sector. However, there is no
need of subsidy to the use of intermediate goods in the South since, due to the absence of intel-
lectual property enforcement, the intermediate monopolists in competition with competitive
pirates, are forced to sell their output at marginal cost in the South.19
The program of this sector is thus the maximization of
(∫ φA
0 xS( j)α d j
)
LYS
β RSγ −∫ φA
0 pS( j)xS( j) d j − wS LYS − pR(1 + θS)RS , with respect to all xS( j), LYS and RS . Here,
the variables introduced with a subscript S have the same meaning as those introduced in the
previous subsection but transposed to the South.
The behavior of this sector is summarized by the first-order conditions
αxS( j)α−1LYS
β RSγ = pS( j), j ∈ [0, φA], (15)
β
YS
LYS
= wS, (16)
γ
YS
RS
= pRτS, (17)
where τS = 1 + θS > 0.
3.1.3 The Intermediate Sector
Each innovation is protected by a patent in the North which gives rise to a monopoly position
of the northern intermediate sector on the northern market. The enforcement of IPRs in the
North prevents the competition between these monopolies and the southern pirates on the
northern market.20 There is no IPRs enforcement in the South so that the northern patents are
17 As the labor markets are segmented due to the fixity of this factor, there are two wages in the economy.
18 In what follows, for notational convenience, we may prefer to use the multiplicative rate τ than the ad
valorem rate θ .
19 In other words, the optimal subsidy is zero. We will come back to this point in the next subsection.
20 In other words, IPRs prevent the northern sector to buy an intermediate from the southern pirates and thus
force the sector to buy from the patent holder.
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not protected on the southern market. Hence, a northern intermediate monopoly can exercise
its monopoly power only in the North. In the South, this monopoly cannot earn anything
from its sales. Therefore, the profit of the j th monopolist is (pN ( j) − 1) xN (pN ( j)), where
xN (pN ( j)) is the demand for the intermediate good j by the northern final sector.
The price chosen by the monopoly in the North is
pN ( j) = 1
α
, ∀ j ∈ [0, A], (18)
which happens to be independent of j . In the South, competition due to the absence of IPRs
implies that the intermediates are sold at their marginal cost21:
pS( j) = 1, ∀ j ∈ [0, φA]. (19)
As a result, the equilibrium is symmetric with respect to the quantities of intermediate
goods:
xN =
(
α2 LYN
β RN γ
(1 − sN )
) 1
1−α
, xS =
(
αLYS
β RSγ
) 1
1−α
. (20)
No profit is made on xS . The whole spot profit of an intermediate producer is made from its
sales to the North (xN ):
πI G =
(
1 − α
α
)
xN . (21)
3.1.4 The Research Sector
The intermediate sector buys patents from the research sector at their market value,22
V (t) =
+∞∫
t
πI G(s)e
−
s∫
t
r(u) du
ds, (22)
where r is the interest rate. The existence of several assets (namely bonds and patents) implies
that their rates of return must be equal in equilibrium. Indeed, by log-differentiating (22),
we get
∀t ∈ [0,+∞), r(t) =
˙V (t)
V (t)
+ πI G(t)
V (t)
. (23)
The profit of the research sector is πR = A˙V −wA(1−σ)L RA , where σ is the subsidy rate
to the employment of researchers. Free-entry in this sector leads to the standard zero-profit
condition:
V (t) = wN (1 − σ)
ψ A
. (24)
21 The northern monopolists are indifferent between letting the pirates produce and selling to the South at
the marginal cost. For simplicity, we will assume all along that the intermediates are produced in the North.
Because no rent can be extracted from the firms using intermediates in the South, no profit is made on the sales
of intermediates to the South. Then, our results are robust to the alternative assumption that pirates supply
competitively the intermediates used in the South.
22 Since patents are bought before the intermediate monopolies earn the profits πI G above, the intermediate
sector supplies bonds that are demanded by households. On this, see also the households’ problem below.
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3.1.5 The Extraction Sector
The extraction sector maximizes its discounted profits,
∫ +∞
t p
R(s)R(s)e−
∫ s
t r(u) du ds,
with respect to R(t), t ∈ [0,+∞), under its stock constraint (5).
The latter program thus results in the Hotelling condition
r(t) = p˙
R(t)
pR(t)
, t ∈ [0,+∞). (25)
3.1.6 Households’ Optimization
The households living in both countries, i = N , S, maximize their intertemporal utility,∫ +∞
0 ln
(
Ci
Li E
λ
)
e−ρt dt , with respect to (Ci )t∈[0,+∞), subject to their budget constraint and
the rule that there are no Ponzi games:
Ci + B˙i ≤ wi Li + r Bi + Hi , (26)
lim
t→+∞ Bi (t)e
−
t∫
0
r(s) ds
= 0, (27)
where Hi captures all lump-sum transfers to the country i households.23 This term includes
funding of public subsidies and sharing of tax revenues and profits of local firms. Appendix B
details all the flows of uses and resources of all agents and shows that HS = pR(RN + RS)+
θS pR RS and HN = θN pR RN − pN sN AxN − σwN L AN . More precisely, HN represents the
northern environmental tax revenues minus the subsidies to the research sector and to the use
of intermediates by the northern final sector, while HS represents the resource revenues and
the southern environmental tax revenues. Bi is the country i’s net stock of financial assets.24
The first-order conditions of the above program imply the standard Ramsey-Keynes
conditions:
gci = r − ρ, i = N , S. (28)
3.2 Decentralized Equilibrium Outcome
Let us now characterize the general equilibrium of the economy. For simplicity, we will
present it under some restrictions.
First, in order to focus on the environmental issue, we will correct the distortions related
to the under-investment in research. Moreover, this will simplify the analysis a good deal.25
Above, the optimal subsidy to the use of intermediates in the South is shown to be zero. As
concerns the optimal subsidy in the North, Eqs. (12) and (18) and the unity of the marginal cost
of producing an intermediate good lead to the standard subsidy level: soN = 1 − α. Formula
(C.12) in Appendix C, together with (A.24) in Appendix A, show that the optimal subsidy
23 The way these two terms enter the representative households’ problems supposes that the sharing of net
governments’ budgets and positive local rents is symmetric. This assumption implies that the current paper
does not consider local inequality and intra-country transfers.
24 These assets are actually bonds supplied by the intermediate sector to finance the buying of patents.
25 Characterizing completely the equilibrium outcome only requires to set the subsidies to the use of interme-
diates at their optimal levels. However, solving the two Romer distortions from the beginning appears to be
much more convenient as regards the presentation of the remainder of the paper. Later in this section, we will
punctually lift the assumption of an optimal subsidy to research employment in order to examine the effect of
environmental taxes on growth.
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to employment by the research sector is σ o = 1 − (1 − α)ψ/[β(ρ + ψL N )/(βρ/(ψ(1 −
α)) − φ(1−α)/β L S) − βρ]. This is a generalization of the standard subsidy to the case of
two countries: one being engaged in research and the other not enforcing IPRs. In particular,
one can note that σ o is increasing in the southern index of productivity, φ: because of the
non-enforcement of IPRs in the South, the northern incentives to innovate do not depend on
the diffusion of knowledge; the subsidy σ o aims in particular at making the North internalize
the usefulness of its innovations for the southern final sector. This usefulness is all the larger
as the South is productive.
Second, we restrict the national taxes to evolve over time in the same way and not to be too
decreasing, i.e. gτN (t) = gτS (t) = gτ (t) > −ρ, for all t ∈ [0,+∞). Later, we will show
that it is a necessary condition of the implementation of the first-best equilibrium. Moreover,
a difference in the growth rates of these taxes cannot be assumed for more than a finite period
of time. Indeed, if these taxes diverge forever, the economy would become too unbalanced in
the long run and one country would then collapse.26 We will thus conserve this assumption
even when studying the effects of changes in national tax levels.
Next, let us assume from now on that the southern households do not initially own bonds,
i.e. BS(0) = 0. The amount of bonds being equal to the financial demand of the intermediate
sector to buy patents, it means that the southern households are not initially the creditors of
the owners of patents.27
The main findings about the decentralized equilibrium are summarized in Proposition 2
and detailed below.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium of the decentralized economy, when the subsidies to the use of
the intermediate goods and to employment in research are optimal:
ı) LYN and L AN immediately jump to constant values. Thus, gAN = gAS = gA = ψL AN is
always constant. The relative output, YN (t)YS(t) , is constant over time, is a decreasing function
of the index of southern productivity, φ, and a decreasing function of the relative tax, τN (t)
τS(t)
.
For given local outputs, YN (t) and YS(t), the consumption levels, CN (t) and CS(t), are
respectively increasing and decreasing functions of the northern tax rate, τN (t).
ı ı) If gτ is constant over time, the economy immediately jumps to its steady-state, in which:
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
gRN = gRS = gR = −ρ − gτ
gCN = gCS = gC = gY = gYN = gYS = gA − γ (ρ+gτ )1−α
gxN = gxS = gx = − γ (ρ+gτ )1−α
.
If gτ = 0, this steady-state equilibrium is identical to the optimal one when households are
indifferent to the environmental quality (λ = 0).
ı ı ı) If gτ (t) is not constant over time, the economy is always in transition. At any date, the
growth rates of RN (t), RS(t), R(t), CN (t), CS(t), C(t), YN (t), YS(t), Y (t), xN (t), xS(t) and
x(t) are decreasing in gτ (t).
Proof of Proposition 2 See Appendix C.
26 In a particular case where gτN 	= gτS forever, one can show that one of the no-Ponzi game conditions is
violated.
27 In the equilibrium at date 0, only the total amount of bonds owned by northern and southern households is
determined. The particular sharing of this amount between both kinds of households is an arbitrary assump-
tion about initial endowments. Our assumption is made for simplicity. Under an alternative assumption on the
sharing of initial financial endowments, our results would have been the same but conditional on this sharing.
It would have thus given more complicated expressions of consumption levels.
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Let us first explain the role of the growth rate of the environmental taxes, gτ , on the dynam-
ics of the economy. An increase (decrease) in gτ (t) implies a decrease (increase) in the rate
of extraction gR . Indeed, the evolution of the taxes distorts the evolution of the producer
price of the resource. Formally, from the Hotelling rule (25), the Ramsey-Keynes conditions
(28) and the growth rates given in (C.5) and (C.6), the law of motion of the resource price is
given by gpR = gA + βρ/(1 − α) − γ gτ /(1 − α). This affects the choice of the extraction
sector about when to supply the resource. For instance, if this sector anticipates a higher tax
in the future, and thus a relatively lower price, it will supply more resource immediately and
less in the future, i.e. it will extract the resource faster. In turn, the speed of extraction will
influence the growth rates of the other unfixed inputs, and thus of the total production and
consumption. This effect has been cogently highlighted in some papers (e.g. Sinclair 1992;
Grimaud and Rougé 2005; Sinn 2008 and Daubanes 2008). Beyond the effects of the time
profile of the environmental taxes, our two-country approach enables to study how the level
of the tax in one region affects the global economy.
Let us now examine the effects of the absolute levels of the taxes. These are rather different
from those of their time profile. First, they affect the allocation of the resource among the
two final sectors. Because the producer price of the resource is the same wherever it is used,
an increase in the tax rate of one country relative to the other renders the resource relatively
more expensive there. The marginal productivities being equalized to the local final prices,
this implies that a higher part of the flow of resource is used, and thus a higher part of the
output is produced, in the latter country. In other words, the levels of the resource taxes imply
some relocation of the economic activity.
Second, they imply transfers among countries. In Appendix C, (C.10) and (C.11) give the
initial consumption levels in the two countries: CN (0) = (1−α)YN (0)−γρDYN (0)/τN (0)
and CS(0) = (1 −α)YS(0)+ γρDYN (0)/τN (0), where D is a given positive scalar. In these
equations, the northern tax rate, τN , affects directly, i.e. beyond its effects through the national
outputs, the consumption levels. Precisely, taking as given the national productions, it affects
positively the northern consumption and negatively the southern one. From condition (14),
the total payment for the resource input by the northern final sector is τN pR RN = γ YN . This
is composed by the net resource revenues made in the North, pR RN = γ YN /τN , and the tax
revenues from the northern use of the resource, (τN − 1)pR RN = γ YN (τN − 1)/τN . From
these expressions, the northern output being taken as constant, an increase in the northern tax
rate increases the tax revenues at the expense of the resource revenues. The former remaining
in the North and the latter being earned by the South, this capture of some resource rents
through taxation improves the consumption of northern households and deteriorates that of
the southern ones. This rent transfer effect has already been mentioned formally out of the
environmental literature by Bergstrom (1982) and Brander and Djajic (1983) 28. This distri-
butional effect has much to do with the inelasticity of the asymptotic cumulated extraction
of the resource (On this, see also Sinn 2008). As concerns the tax on the southern use of the
resource, τS , it has not this distributional effect. Indeed, tax revenues made via this tax would
be earned anyway by the South government through resource revenues. Hence, this tax only
affects the relative output of both regions but do not enter directly their consumption.
Let us now evoke the potential dynamic effects of the tax levels. Contrary to their growth
rates, gτ , the levels of the tax, τN and τS , do not affect any growth rate. However, if the tax
levels influence the geographic repartition of the productive activities, and thus of the use
of each intermediate good, and if IPRs are not homogeneously enforced across countries,
28 Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) also mentioned it, but not formally. In their conclusion, they noted that if the
resource supply is perfectly inelastic ”(...) carbon taxes may have no economic effect at all and would simply
redistribute rents from the resource owners to the government”.
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one could expect them to affect the revenues from innovating, and thus growth. Actually,
even if the subsidy to employment in research is suboptimal, the local taxes have no growth
effect. In Appendix C (formula (C.4)), the allocation of labor is shown to be given by LYN =
(ρ + ψL N )/[ψ(1 + (1 − α)/(β(1 − σ)))] and L AN = L N − LYN while growth is driven by
gA = ψL AN (formula (C.3)). There is no labor reallocation in the North after a change in
national taxes. Let us consider an increase in τN . It implies a relocation of the mobile inputs
(intermediates and resource) towards the South. On the one hand, the value of innovations
decreases because the use of intermediates in the South is not profitable. This deteriorates the
productivity of northern researchers. On the other hand, relocation of mobile inputs decreases
the productivity of workers in the northern final sector as well. In a Cobb-Douglas world, the
marginal productivities of labor in the two sectors decrease by the same proportion, thus not
requiring any reallocation on the northern labor market. This explains the absence of the pre-
sumed growth effect of the tax levels.29 Nevertheless, this effect would appear under other,
more realistic functional forms. Generally, because relocation deteriorates the productivity
of northern labor in its two uses, this effect can be expected to be mitigated.
3.3 Optimal Environmental Taxation
In the previous subsection, the subsidies to the use of the intermediates and to the research
sector have been set at their optimal levels. Here, they remain at these levels so that we
keep focusing exclusively on the pollution externality. By comparing the rate of extraction
in the welfare-maximizing allocation and in the decentralized outcome, we can solve for the
resource taxation policy that implements an optimal use over time of the polluting resource.
The following proposition gives the main characteristics of this policy.
Proposition 3 ı) For the rate of extraction, R, and thus the rate of pollution accumulation,
E˙ , to be efficient, the local tax rates on the resource use, τN and τS, must evolve at the same
negative rate of growth, goτ .
ı ı) For the allocation of the flow of resource, R, between the two final sectors, N and S, to
be efficient, these tax rates must be equalized.
Proof of Proposition 3 See Appendix C.
The equality of both tax rates, τN and τS , is required for efficiency. Indeed, it ensures
that the resource final prices, and thus the resource marginal productivities, are equalized
in both countries, which is a necessary condition for static efficiency. However, because the
tax levels do not affect the dynamics of extraction, they play no role in the correction of the
environmental externality.
To correct it, they simply should have the same optimal growth rate. As argued in the
previous subsection, this rate is the relevant instrument to manipulate the extraction path.
It is worth noting that, even with different local tax levels, the global environmental prob-
lem could be theoretically solved by the use of this latter instrument. The equalization of the
local taxes has thus nothing to do with the environmental correction but with the efficiency
of the resource allocation.
Overall, the optimal international tax, inducing the efficiency of both the allocation of the
resource over time and the split of its instantaneous flow, is defined up to an homothecy: if
τN (t) = τS(t) = τ(t), t ≥ 0 is optimal, then kτN (t) = kτS(t) = kτ(t), t ≥ 0, ∀k > 0 is
also optimal.
29 Here, its absence will simplify substantially the analysis.
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In Appendix C (formula (C.13)), the optimal time profile of the common tax rate is shown
to be decreasing over time. This time profile would provide the society with an incentive to
postpone the depletion of the polluting resource, i.e. to extract it slower. This is consistent
with the remark in Section 2 that the introduction of pollution implies a slower optimal deple-
tion. In Sinclair (1992) and Groth and Schou (2007), the same property arises. It extends to
the case where the flow of pollution is harmful (Grimaud and Rougé 2005) and is robust to
the introduction of a decaying stock of pollution (Ulph and Ulph 1994 and Withagen 1994).
Compared to these results obtained in aggregated models, our two-country approach
emphasizes the need that countries coordinate on an international tax level. The remain-
der of the paper focuses on the difficulty to achieve such a coordination by investigating the
national conflicting viewpoints about the two environmental tax rates.
4 Effects of the National Tax Levels
In this section, we focus on the effects of the environmental taxes on the consumption levels
and welfare of both countries. We keep assuming that the only distortion is environmental,
i.e. sN = soN , sS = soS and σ = σ o. Moreover, we keep assuming that gτN = gτS = gτ ,
but we allow this growth rate not to be optimal and we let the environmental tax rates, τN
and τS , not be equals. By effects of the tax levels, we mean effects of the mere fact that a
country sets a higher or a lower tax rate, its time profile, given by gτ (t), t ≥ 0, remaining
unchanged.30
The previous section gave some insights about the effects of the tax levels on consumption.
In particular, their distributional aspects provide heterogeneous countries with conflicting
interests. This is why the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources should be addressed in a
multi-country setting featuring some heterogeneity. However, stating this distributional effect
is not sufficient since the tax rates also affect consumption through their relocational effect,
likely to be related to global efficiency. Indeed, one country in the global economy, when
setting its tax rate, faces the interference of these channels. Hence the two kinds of effects
on the decentralized equilibrium have to be examined separately and assessed together. This
is the objective of this section.
4.1 Rent Capture
Isolating the rent transfer effect of the tax levels requires to rule out relocation, i.e. changes
in national output. To this purpose, the following proposition considers an increase in both
tax rates that does not modify their ratio.
Proposition 4 An increase in both tax levels, τN and τS, by the same proportion, i.e. their
ratio τN /τS remaining unchanged,
ı) does not entail any relocation, the national outputs, YN and YS, being unaffected at all
dates.
30 More formally, a tax policy is represented by a function of time, τ(t), for all t ∈ [0,+∞). Restricting
attention to functions that are differentiable, any tax profile (τ (t))+∞t=0 is completely characterized by ı) an
initial level, τ(0), and ı ı) a rate of growth profile, (gτ (t))+∞t=0 . From now on, by considering a change in the
tax level, we refer to a change in the initial level, the growth rate profile remaining unchanged, that is to say
a homothetic transformation of the whole tax profile, i.e. the substitution of τ(t) by kτ(t), k > 0, for all
t ∈ [0,+∞).
123
Taxation of a Polluting Non-renewable Resource 583
ı ı) implies an inter-country transfer, increasing the northern consumption, CN , at the
expense of the southern one, CS, at all dates.
Proof of Proposition 4 See Appendix D.
Since it can be isolated from any distortion, this rent transfer effect is purely distributional.
As detailed in Subsection 3.2, this effect is a transfer from the exploiters’ rent to northern
tax revenues. It thus benefits the resource poor economy and deteriorates the revenues of
the resource rich country. Moreover, the tax rates play an asymmetric role: the only tax rate
involved in this rent transfer effect is the northern one. Indeed, the southern tax rate would
make the South collect tax revenues it would have earned anyway through resource rents.
As a consequence, this effect will provide only the resource poor North with an incentive
to tax high.
4.2 Relocation and Global Inefficiency
Changes in the tax ratio entail, in equilibrium, a change in the relative marginal productivity
of the resource. Their effects are twofold. First, it changes the geographic split of the resource
flow, thus modifying national productions. Second, it necessarily affects the total output. The
following proposition assesses these effects.
For simplicity, let us consider a change in the relative tax caused by a unilateral change
in the northern tax level.
Proposition 5 World production, Y = YN + YS, is maximal when the tax levels, τN and τS,
are equalized across countries.
A unilateral increase in the northern tax level, τN ,
ı) leads to some relocation of the final production by decreasing the northern output, YN ,
and increasing the southern one, YS, at all dates.
ı ı) yields a global efficiency distortion, the world output Y increasing at all dates if τN < τS
and decreasing if τN > τS.
Proof of Proposition 5 See Appendix D.
A change in the tax ratio improves the relative competitiveness of one country and plays
an important role on the efficiency of the resource allocation among the two economies.
This allocation is optimal when final prices, and thus marginal resource productivities, are
equalized. A departure from this equality distorts the world economy. Proposition 5 tells in
particular that the split of the resource flow between the two countries is all the less efficient
as the tax rates are wide apart.
In Fig. 2, Y max is the first bisecting line. The derivative of the world production level at
any date with respect to the northern tax level, ∂Y (t)/∂τN (0), ∀t ≥ 0, is zero on this line,
negative above (sectors 1, 2 and 6) and positive below (sectors 3, 4 and 5).31
Because relocation comes from changes in the tax ratio, the effect of an increase in the
southern tax level is similar to that in the northern one. Hence, relocation affects both coun-
tries in a rather symmetric way. It implies that a higher tax in one region, whatever it is,
31 Because the tax levels grow at the same rate, we could have represented the graph of Fig. 2 in terms of the
tax levels τN (t) and τS(t) at any date t ≥ 0. For consistency with our definition of the tax levels in note 30
and with Appendix D, we choose a basis in terms of the taxes at date 0.
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τS(0)
τ N
(0)
Fig. 2 Effects of an increase in the northern tax level,τN(0), on national consumptions, CN and CS, and world
production, Y
reduces its output. Moreover, the impact of the tax rates on global efficiency gives a common
interest in having close tax rates. However, we shall see later that the more totally productive
one country is, the less affected it is by the relocation resulting from a relatively higher local
tax.
4.3 Total Effects of a Unilateral Increase in the Tax Level
The national tax levels affect national consumptions and welfare through both rent capture
and relocation. After characterizing these two effects separately, it is worth computing the
overall change in national consumptions due to changes in the tax rates. As in the previous
subsection, let us consider a unilateral change in the northern tax level. The impacts of such
a change will depend on how high are the two national levels with respect to each other.
The results are formally given in Appendix D. The main findings are presented in Propo-
sition 6 and illustrated and detailed below.
Proposition 6 An increase in the northern tax level, τN , leads to an increase in the northern
consumption, CN , at all dates if the northern tax level is relatively low. It leads to an increase
in the southern consumption, CS, if both the southern tax level and the northern one are
relatively high.
Proof of Proposition 6 See Appendix D.
In Fig. 2, along CN max and CSmax , the derivatives of the northern and the southern
consumption levels at all dates with respect to the northern tax level, ∂CN (t)/∂τN (0) and
∂CS(t)/∂τN (0), ∀t ≥ 0, respectively, are zero. These loci divide generally32 the strictly
32 The form of Fig. 2 and its sectors are general. Figure 2 is an illustration for a certain combination of
parameters but its form is shown to be general in Appendix D.
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positive orthant into six sectors. ∂CN (t)/∂τN (0) is positive below CN max (sectors 4, 5 and
6) and negative above (sectors 1, 2 and 3). ∂CS(t)/∂τN (0) is positive above the defined part
of CSmax (sectors 2, 3 and 4) and negative otherwise (sectors 1, 5 and 6).
The interference of the two effects analyzed above happens to be complicated: one can
a priori hardly tell something about the effects of a unilateral tax increase on the two con-
sumption levels, since they could be everything and anything. Let us refer to our previous
results to understand how the tax rates affect consumption in both regions.
From the northern viewpoint, a greater tax rate would be beneficial if the tax rate is low
and detrimental if it is already high. This results from the trade-off highlighted in the previous
subsections. On the one hand, a greater environmental tax leads to more tax revenues. On the
other hand, it leads to less competitiveness relatively to the other country, and thus relocation
of its productive activities. Proposition 6 tells that the latter effect more than compensates the
former when the North has a relatively high tax rate and inversely otherwise. This northern
tax increase leads to a greater southern consumption if both the northern and the southern
tax rates are high. In that case, the relocation effect benefits the South and compensates the
rent capture effect.
What about the viewpoint of the South with respect to its own tax rate? A greater tax rate
in the South would make it relatively less competitive. Moreover, as noted in Subsection 4.1,
the South would not benefit from any rent capture effect.
As a result, if countries are not coordinated in the setting of their local taxes, the North
would choose a relatively high tax rate.
In order to illustrate this and the conflicting interests of the two different regions as con-
cerns their environmental tax levels, let us consider that the two governments use strategically
their tax levels to maximize their residents’ utilities, subject to the decentralized decisions
of firms. For simplicity, assume that the rate of growth of the taxes is given to them. In this
context, the best-response of the North government (maximizing northern welfare) can be
shown to be represented by CN max . In Appendix D, the best-response of the South (maxi-
mizing southern welfare) is computed: it is independent of the northern tax rate. It would thus
be represented in Fig. 2 by a vertical line that is shown to be located at the left of the vertical
asymptote of CSmax (represented by the dotted vertical line). Hence, the Nash equilibrium
of this simple game is along CN max , at a point below the vertical asymptote of CSmax (as
for instance, point E in Fig. 2). Let us give further details and make two remarks on this
equilibrium.
First, in the Nash outcome, the North has indeed a greater tax rate than the South. Our
examination of the rent transfer effect and of the relocation effect suggests that this gap is
mainly due to the asymmetric rent transfer effect, the North benefiting more than the South
from a high tax rate on the polluting resource. This implies that the economically relevant
regions of Fig. 2 are sectors 1 and 6. These regions are also relevant because this Nash equi-
librium is consistent with empirical findings. Indeed, Bacon (2001) shows that tax rates on
petroleum products are significantly higher in oil importing countries than in oil exporting
counties. In particular, taxes on petroleum products in developed oil consuming countries
are very high (IEA 2001).
Second, the equation of CN max , in (D.1), shows that the best-response of the North is
decreasing in the index of development of the South, φ, whereas the best-response of the
South is independent of φ. Hence, the poorer the South is, the higher point E is along the
southern best-response, and the wider the gap between the northern and the southern tax
rates. The explanation for this is the following: from the northern viewpoint, the negative
effect of a high tax rate is its loss of competitiveness and the related relocation towards the
South. The less totally productive the South is, the less affected by the threat of relocation
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the North is. As a result, the North chooses a tax rate that is all the greater as the South is
low-productive. This is also supported by Bacon’s observations. Indeed, he notes that higher-
income countries set their average per unit taxes on gasoline and diesel two and a half times
higher than developing countries do.
Eventually, these remarks imply that the current distortion due to the gap between the
tax rates in the oil consuming countries and those in the oil producing ones is all the more
serious as the latter have a relatively low productivity compared to the former. Moreover,
it suggests that an increase in the tax rates on petroleum products in some oil consuming
countries, where these rates are already very high (sector 1 in Fig. 2), would deteriorate the
efficiency of the world allocation of oil and would make people of the two regions worse-off.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have divided a model of a non-renewable resource depletion and of pollution
accumulation into two regions in order to investigate the inter-country effects of local envi-
ronmental taxes in a heterogeneous world. We have then constructed a two-country growth
model in which the South is endowed with the entire stock of an essential polluting non-
renewable resource and in which world economic growth is driven by a northern research
sector.
First, the welfare maximizing allocation and the decentralized equilibrium outcome for
given national tax rates have been fully characterized. Consistently with the one-country
literature, we obtain that the time-profile of environmental taxes alters the extraction path
and thus the speed of pollution accumulation. The socially optimal resource depletion is
implemented through decreasing ad valorem tax rates on the use of the polluting resource
in the two countries. Beyond the correction of the environmental problem, this extension to
two countries emphasizes that their coordination on a common tax level is required to ensure
the efficiency of the resource allocation. However, this coordination appears to be difficult
given the divergent views of the two heterogeneous countries regarding their tax rates.
Our study of the international effects of national environmental tax rates highlights the
reasons of this coordination problem. First, higher taxes lead to a partial capture of the south-
ern resource rent by the North through tax revenues in a purely distributional way. Second, a
higher environmental tax in one country deteriorates its relative competitiveness. The result-
ing relocation deteriorates global efficiency of the international split of the resource flow
if it moves one tax rate further apart the other. However, in spite of this relocation and the
heterogeneous IPRs protection, local tax levels do not affect the effort of research and thus
growth.
As a result of these effects, the oil poor region is attracted by high environmental tax rates
while the oil rich region is not. If the tax levels are set at the national scale, they will be
used strategically, thus entailing heterogeneous tax rates. The resulting gap in environmen-
tal taxes appears to be all the wider as the oil-rich countries are relatively poor. Overall, a
global distortion arises on the static allocation of oil, even when taxes are designed so that
the environmental problem is corrected. Such a non-environmental distortion is of a partic-
ular concern as this resource is bound to get scarcer and scarcer. This suggests an argument
against the use of national taxes in the fight against climate change, at the benefit of a world
taxation policy and of other instruments ensuring the efficiency of the international allocation
of polluting resources.
Furthermore, we have assessed the effect of a hypothetical increase in the northern tax
rate on the polluting exhaustible resource. From the current situation, with already very high
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environmental taxes in the North, the analysis suggests that increasing their level would
deteriorate global efficiency and would make the two regions worse-off.
Addressing the strategic tax-setting issue in a satisfying way would actually require to
apply dynamic game theoretic tools, which is extremely difficult in a resource depletion
model. Further research must tackle this question in order to improve our understanding of
environmental tax design. Indeed, whether taxes are used or not to implement international
environmental policies, homogenizing the currently very heterogeneous taxes on oil will be
needed to improve the allocation of this scarce resource.
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